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Tufts v. Commissioner. Reopening the
Pandora's Box of Crane's Footnote 37
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to
determine whether a taxpayer, upon disposition of property,
must include the full amount of nonrecourse liability in the
"amount realized" when determining gain or loss on the disposition. The author criticizes the Fifth Circuit's reliance on
Crane v. Commissioner's infamous footnote 37, which intimates
that the amount of nonrecourse debt included by a taxpayer in
the amount realized should be limited to the fair market value
of the property encumbered by the nonrecoursedebt. This limitation results in the inconsistent valuation of nonrecourse debt
in the unadjusted basis (depreciable base) on acquisition and
in the amount realized on disposition.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court indirectly laid the foundation for a variety of tax shelter devices when it held in Crane v. Commissioner'
that the basis of an investment includes the full amount of any
nonrecourse debt used to finance the investment. Additionally, the
Court held that, upon disposition of the investment, the seller's
"amount realized" from the transaction would include the pur-

chaser's assumption of the nonrecourse debt.* In footnote 37 to the
1. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. I.R.C. § 1001 prescribes the gain or loss calculation for sales or dispositions of certain
assets and provides in part:
(a) Computation of gain or loss
The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of
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opinion, however, the Court remarked that the nonrecourse debt's
disposition value might be limited to the underlying investment's
fair market value.8 Footnote 37 raised the possbility of inconsistent
valuations of the debt at disposition: The property's adjusted basis
would reflect the face value of the nonrecourse debt while the
amount realized would be limited to the property's fair market
value. Thus, if the property declined in value, a taxpayer possibly
could enjoy a taxable loss on the disposition of the asset without
investing any money. After Crane, a series of decisions in the
United States Courts of Appeals and the Tax Court eliminated the
opportunity for differing valuations of nonrecourse debt by ignoring footnote 37's fair market value limitation. Recently, however,
in Tufts v. Commissioner,5 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reinstated footnote 37's fair market value
limitation.
In 1970, John and Mary Tufts, together with five other partners, formed a general partnership to construct and operate an
apartment complex. The partnership financed the project with $1.8
million of nonrecourse debt secured by a mortgage on the property.' Adverse economic conditions caused the property's fair market value to decline to $1.4 million while the mortgage principal
balance remained at $1.8 million. In 1972, the partners sold their
entire partnership interest to an unrelated third party for a nominal sum.7 The purchaser acquired the property subject to the nonthe amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011
for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the amount realized.
(b) Amount realized
The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be
the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other
than money) received.
I.R.C. § 1001(a)-(b) (1976). All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, unless otherwise specified.
3. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37. The footnote states:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to
the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a
mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage
without receiving boot. That is not this case.
4. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
5. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2034
(1982).
6. 651 F.2d at 1059.
7. Id. The purchaser agreed to pay up to $250 of the costs of the transaction, irrespective of the property's value.
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recourse note.8 All of the partners deducted depreciation in 1970,
1971, and 1972. 9
Each partner reported a loss on the sale of his partnership interest,10 theorizing that section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code
required inclusion of the release from a nonrecourse liability in
"amount realized" only to the extent of the fair market value of
the property securing the note." The Commissioner determined,
however, that each partner should have realized the full amount of
the nonrecourse debt.1 The Tax Court ruled for the Commissioner' 8 and the taxpayers appealed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, reversed: "[Tjhe fair market
value of the property securing a nonrecourse debt limits the extent
to which the debt can be included in the amount realized on disposition of the property."14 Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982)..
The Fifth Circuit framed the ultimate issue narrowly, considering only whether the full amount of the nonrecourse debt should
have been included in the amount realized on disposition, irrespective of the debt's effect on the property's basis and subsequent depreciation deductions. 5 This narrow focus caused the court to ignore policy and equity considerations underlying federal tax law.
The Fifth Circuit's use of the fair market value limitation allowed
the taxpayer to permanently exclude from income certain tax benefits arising from the inclusion for depreciation purposes of the
nonrecourse debt in the investment's basis. Moreover, the court arguably reached the wrong result on the narrowly framed issue. 6
8. Id. at 1059.
9. 70 T.C. 756, 760 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
2034 (1982).

10. The amounts of the losses were not specified. In their petitions to the Tax Court,
each partner alleged that he had realized a deductible long-term capital loss in an amount

equal to the full amount of his cash basis, and claimed he was entitled to a refund for
overpayment of taxes in an amount to be determined by the court. 70 T.C. at 761.
11. 651 F.2d at 1059.
12. Id.

13. 70 T.C. at 770.
14. 651 F.2d at 1063.
15. 651 F.2d at 1063 n.9. The court stated that "the following remarks are necessary to

put this case in its proper perspective. First, and most important, the precise issue before
this court is extremely narrow: whether the tax court properly included the full amount of
nonrecourse debt in amount realized." Id.
16. The taxpayer made two arguments for limiting the amount realized to the property's fair market value, one based on Crane's footnote 37 and the other based on I.R.C. §
752(c) (1976). On the footnote 37 issue, the Fifth Circuit's decision conflicts with the positions of the Third Circuit, the Tax Court, and the Treasury Department. See Millar v. Coin-
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II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Crane v. Commissioner

The Fifth Circuit began its analysis with a review of the
landmark case, Crane v. Commissioner.1" In Crane, the taxpayer
inherited an apartment building and lot encumbered by a mortgage, which provided the sole security for the debt. The face value
of the mortgage and accrued interest equaled the property's fair
market value; thus, the taxpayer had no equity in the property.
The taxpayer held the property for seven years, deducting $25,500
in depreciation, and then sold it for $2,500. The purchaser acquired the property subject to the mortgage. In calculating the
gain on disposition, the taxpayer claimed a zero basis in the property, her equity in the project. Accordingly, the taxpayer arrived at
a gain of $2,500.1'
The taxpayer argued that on the date of acquisition her equity
in the property was zero because the property's fair market value
equaled the outstanding balance of the nonrecourse debt. She further argued that no depreciation deductions should have been allowed because her equity in the property, and therefore her basis,
was zero." The Commissioner countered with the argument that
the basis and amount realized should reflect the underlying value
of the physical property itself, undiminished by the mortgage.
The Supreme Court reviewed both the acquisition and disposition of Mrs. Crane's property. In determining the property's basis
missioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Estate of Delman v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 29 (1979); Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 649, 655
(1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952); Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214. Additionally,
the Treasury Regulations disagree with, and commentators have criticized on theoretical
grounds, footnote 37. See Tress. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980); Adams, Exploring the Outer
Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAx L. REv.
159 (1966); Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv.
277 (1978); Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized under Crane: A Current View of Some
Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1969); Del Cotto, Sales and
Other Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001: The Taxable Event, Amount Realized
and Related Problems of Basis, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 219, 317-34 (1977); Friedland, Tufts
and Millar: Two New Views of the Crane Case and Its Famous Footnote, 57 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 510 (1982); Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1 (1982). But see Pietrovito, Tufts v. Commissioner: A Limitation on the
Inclusion of Nonrecourse Liabilities in Amount Realized, 11 CAP. U.L. REv. 265 (1981);
Comment, Tufts-The Resurrection of Crane's Footnote 37, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 575
(1981). For a discussion of the § 752(c) issue, see infra text accompanying notes 67-81.
17. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. The Court noted Mrs. Crane's inconsistent position. Id. at 3 n.2. Its ruling on
the basis issue, however, rendered the point moot. Id. at 12.
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at the date of acquisition, the Court interpreted section 113(a)(5)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 19390 to require that the prop-

erty's unadjusted basis equal Mrs. Crane's ownership interest in1
the total value of the property, undiminished by the mortgage.2
Under this approach, basis is not predicated on equity and therefore depreciation would be based on the property's total value." In
determining the amount realized upon disposition under section
111(b),'3 the Court discerned a functional relationship between
sections 111 and 113," and held that "property," as used in the
definition of amount realized under section 111(b) also meant the
underlying value of the property undiminished by the mortgage.26
The Court next considered whether circumstances existed in
which the release of a nonrecourse liability *ould not result in taxable income. The Court began its analysis with the proposition
that the release from recourse debt would be includable in the
amount realized because the taxpayer was the real beneficiary of
the "payment."' The Court then posited that owners of property
subject to nonrecourse mortgages, desiring to avoid foreclosures,
would treat nonrecourse mortgages as if they were personal obligations.27 This congruence of perspective between the two types of
20. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113(a)(5), 53 Stat. 1, 41 (current version at
I.R.C. § 1014 (West 1967 & Supp. 1982)), provided that the basis of property acquired by
devise was the fair market value of that property at the date of the decedent's death.
21. The Court advanced several reasons for holding that the word "property" as used in
§ 113(a)(5) meant the owner's legal rights in the land and buildings undiminished by any
mortgages (as opposed to the owner's equity). The Court supported its interpretation by
referring to several dictionaries for the word's ordinary usage, prior administrative construction of the section, Congress's differentiation between "property" and "equity" in other
parts of the Act, and the implications of an "equity" construction. 331 U.S. at 6-9.
22. Id. at 11.
23. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 111(b), 53 Stat. 1, 37 (current version at
I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1976)).
24. 331 U.S. at 12.
25. Id. Even absent the "functional relation" justification, the Court would have defined property as the underlying value of the property free of liens for the same reasons
advanced in its § 113 definition. See supra note 21.
26. Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938)). The Court noted
that prior case law had "repudiated the notion that there must be an actual receipt by the
seller himself of 'money' or 'other property,' in their narrowest senses." Id. at 13. The Court
did not, however, attempt to classify the release from liability as either "money" or "other
property." One possible interpretation of this language is that the Court, by implication,
created an additional category of "amount realized"-an economic equivalent of cash which
falls somewhere between "money" and "other property." The Fifth Circuit adopted this
interpretation in Tufts. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
27. "(T]he reality [is] that an owner of property, mortgaged [with nonrecourse debt] at
a figure less than that at which the property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of
the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations." 331 U.S. at 14 (footnote
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property owners resulted in equivalent economic realities and
therefore mandated equal treatment of recourse and nonrecourse
liabilities. Given this concern for the reality of the situation, the
Court concluded that when a taxpayer sells property subject to
nonrecourse debt and receives additional consideration, he "realizes a benefit in the amount of the mortgage as well as the
7 28
boot.3 "
This extension of tax liability to nonrecourse debt cancellation
was founded on an economic benefit theory. Footnote 37, which
limited the debt cancellation benefit when the debt exceeded the
property's fair market value, became a logically necessary corollary
to the Court's economic benefit theory because the release from
"liability" on a nonrecourse obligation could never be worth more
to a seller than the underlying value of the property. Thus, footnote 37 was an important element of the Court's theoretical position, although unnucessary to a resolution of Mrs. Crane's case.
The Court also addressed Mrs. Crane's alternative argument:
The sixteenth amendment 9 does not encompass "income" from
the cancellation of nonrecourse debt. Dismissing the taxpayer's
contention that the transaction was a ruinous disasters because it
resulted in a tax liability in excess of her cash receipt on the sale,
the Court stated that the taxpayer had received a tax benefit by
including the debt in her basis for depreciation purposes.81 Because the sixteenth amendment does not require the actual receipt
of cash, 8 ' the transaction was taxable."
B.

Lower Court Decisions

There have been no post-Crane Supreme Court cases on the
issue of "amount realized" from the sale or disposition of property
subject to nonrecourse debt. Both the Tax Court and the United
omitted).
28. Id. For the text of footnote 37, see supra note 3. Boot is necessary because it shows
that the value of the property is greater than the lien. See Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455,
458 (1st Cir. 1950).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
30. Professor Bittker empathized with Mrs. Crane's argument, remarking that "the idea
that investors benefit when they are 'relieved' of nonrecourse debt" is "counter-intuitive."
Bittker, supra note 16, at 277.
31. 331 U.S. at 15. The Court noted on this point that "[t]he crux of this case, really, is
whether the law permits her to exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing gain." Id. (footnote omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 16.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:352

States Courts of Appeals have, however, examined the issue and
eschewed adherence to footnote 37. Three years after Crane, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had the first
opportunity to review the Crane rule and footnote 37 in Parker v.
Delaney." In Parker, the mortgagee foreclosed on the taxpayer's
property. The taxpayer was not personally liable for the debt and
received no boot. The court found that boot was not an absolute
requirement for application of the Crane rule, but served only as
evidence that the value of the property was at least equal to the
liens on the property.8 7 Accordingly, the court applied the Crane
rule and held that the amount realized upon disposition included
the amount of the nonrecourse mortgages, despite the absence of
boot. In response to the taxpayer's contention that the property's
value was less than the lien and, as a result, Crane's footnote 37
controlled, the First Circuit rested its opinion on the district
court's finding that the two values were equal absent any factual
basis for concluding otherwise. Thus, the court avoided the harder
question of whether it would follow footnote 37.8"
In a relatively recent case, Millar v. Commissioner,9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit directly faced
a fact pattern that fell within the bounds of Crane'sfootnote 37. In
Millar, the taxpayers transferred stock securing nonrecourse loans
in complete satisfaction of their obligations. The value of the stock
was less than the outstanding balance on the notes. The taxpayers
argued that the amount realized should be limited to the stock's
34. See supra note 16.
35. 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950).

36. In Crane the Court stated, "[A] different problem might be encountered where a
mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiv-

ing boot. That is not this case." 331 U.S. at 14 n.37 (emphasis added).
37. 186 F.2d at 458.

38. Although the First Circuit did not decide this issue, the court's response to both the
boot and fair market value issues indicates that it considered Crane's footnote 37 as prescribing guidelines for future decisions.
In Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the result in Parker. In Woodsam, a
mortgagee foreclosed on the taxpayer corporation's property, which was subject to nonre-

course debt. The "amount realized" issue was ancillary to the real question before the court:
What was the actual basis of the property? Initially, the taxpayer requested a finding that
the value of the property was less than the principal due on the mortgage, bringing the

"amount realized" determination within the ambit of Crane's footnote 37. The taxpayer,
however, withdrew on this issue-a decision the Second Circuit noted with approval, citing
Parker v. Delaney. Id. at 358 n.1. It is unclear whether the Second Circuit rejected the fair
market value limitation of footnote 37 or merely noted that it would be unwilling to find a
market value below the loan value on the facts of the case.
39. 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
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fair market value pursuant to footnote 37. The Third Circuit, however, rejected the taxpayers' contention that footnote 37 provided
a limited exception to the Crane rule, and instead regarded the
footnote as dictum. 40 The Third Circuit read Crane as holding that
when taxpayers use debt to increase their depreciable basis, they
must also include the unpaid portion of that debt in the amount
realized. This holding used a "tax benefit"' 1 rationale and came
from language used by the Crane Court in response to the taxpayer's sixteenth amendment argument: "The crux of this case,
really, is whether the law permits her to exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing gain. We have already
showed that, if it does, the taxpayer can enjoy a double deduction,
42
in effect, on the same loss of assets.'
III.
A.

Tufts v. Commissioner
Footnote 37 Argument

In Tufts v. Commissioner,'8 the Tax Court, relying on Millar,
thought that Crane's footnote 37 was dictum." On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court. After analyzing the reasons underlying the Crane decision, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the fair market value limitation of Crane's footnote 37 should control. 4" According to the
court, Millar's rejection of footnote 37 stemmed from erroneously
reading the Crane decision as resting on a tax benefit theory. 46 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court's concern for
double deductions was unnecessary to the Crane decision because
the Court already had decided the "amount realized" issue prior to
its "double deduction" discussion. The Fifth Circuit chose to regard "this expression of concern as primarily a response to Mrs.
Crane's constitutional argument, and not as the principal justifica40. Id. at 215. The court went on to characterize the footnote as "a postulate or hypothetical observation with respect to a hypothetical set of facts not before the Court and,
indeed, involving a clearly different time and clearly different legal circumstances." Id.
41. In Tufts, the Fifth Circuit characterized the tax benefit theory in Crane as "the
argument. . . that a taxpayer who has previously enjoyed the benefit of large tax deductions, without placing his own assets at risk, has, by taking those deductions, improved his
economic position, thus realizing gain." 651 F.2d at 1060.
42. 331 U.S. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
43. 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
2034 (1981).
44. Id. at 764-66; see also Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 29 (1979).
45. 651 F.2d at 1060.
46. Id; see supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
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tion for the statutory holding. ' 7 The court added that the Crane
Court's concern for double deductions was irrelevant to the
"amount realized" determination because the adjusted basis calculation already reflected depreciation deductions. 8
The Fifth Circuit read Crane as holding that the receipt of an
economic benefit provided the conceptual foundation for gain realization under section 1001(b),' 9 with the release from a nonrecourse liability being such an economic benefit. Because section
1001(b)'s existing categories-"money" and "property (other than
money)"-do not encompass the release from a nonrecourse liability, the Fifth Circuit perceived the necessity for expanding the definition of "amount realized" to include a third category-cash
equivalents.50 Since cash equivalents are not subject to the fair
market value limitation imposed on "property (other than
money)" in section 1001(b), theoretical consistency within the economic benefit theory requires an express fair market value limitation on cash equivalents.51 Footnote 37, providing that limitation,
became a necessary corollary to the Crane economic benefit theory.
After determining footnote 37's purpose, the Fifth Circuit
then criticized the economic benefit theory itself. The court questioned the Supreme Court's premise that "an owner of property,
mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the property will sell,
47. 651 F.2d at 1060.
48. Id. at 1061.
49. "When we look to what the Court said immediately before it announced its conclusion that the Commissioner had properly determined the amount realized, we see that the
Court justified its result on a theory of economic benefit. .. ." Id.
50. The Fifth Circuit stated, without citation, that "[t]he Supreme Court has held that
the definition [of amount realized] can be expanded where an economic benefit equivalent
to cash can be identified." Id. at 1064 n.9. Perhaps the court was referring to the Supreme
Court's assertion that "[t]he cases so deciding have already repudiated the notion that there
must be an actual receipt by the seller himself of 'money' or 'other property,' in their narrowest senses." 331 U.S. at 13. It is arguable whether Crane carved out a new category or
whether the Court merely noted that existing categories would be construed liberally. Judge
Williams, concurring in Tufts, preferred to characterize the cash equivalency benefit as
"property (other than money)," in conformity with Judge Learned Hand's opinion for the
Second Circuit in Commissioner v. Crane, 153 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1945), afl'd, 331 U.S. 1
(1947). Judge Williams noted that "the Supreme Court expressly avoided characterizing the
" 651 F.2d at 1065 (Wiltaxable economic benefit.. . as either money or property ..
liams, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
51. One cannot benefit economically from the disposition of an asset beyond the fair
market value of the consideration received in exchange; therefore, amounts realized pursuant to § 1001(b) must be limited to the fair market value of the consideration. The nominal
value of "money," the first category of § 1001(b), is its market value because money is the
medium of exchange in a market. "Property (other than money)," the second category, has
an explicit fair market value limitation. Concomitantly, "cash equivalents," the third category, must be limited to their fair market values.
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must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if
they were his personal obligations."" According to the court, the
premise lost its validity as soon as the property owner decided to
dispose of the property, as did both Mrs. Crane and the Tufts:
Relief from a nonrecourse debt is not an economic benefit if it
can be obtained only by giving up the mortgaged property. It is
analogous to the relief one obtains from local real property taxes
by disposing of the property. Like nonrecourse debt, the taxes
must be paid to retain the property; but no one would suggest
that the disposition of unprofitable property produces an economic benefit equal to the present value of the taxes that will
not be paid in the future."
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that if the taxpayer received any benefit, the benefit received probably was less than the
full amount of the nonrecourse debt." The court made no attempt
to measure the benefit, other than to note that a Crane-type seller
would receive "some" benefit along with the boot, because a purchaser had to pay off the mortgage or at least be willing to take the
property subject to the mortgage before the seller could realize the
boot."
Having discarded the economic benefit theory as theoretically
unsound, the court limited Crane to its facts, and then summarily
applied the fair market value limitation of footnote 37 ." Relying
52. 651 F.2d at 1062 (quoting Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947) (footnote
omitted)).
53. 651 F.2d at 1062 (quoting Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane
Case, 33 TAx L. Rav. 277, 282 (1978)). Although it has been suggested that a taxpayer's

desire to maintain his financial reputation may constrain him from "walking away" from a
nonrecourse obligation, the taxpayer confronts no real legal impediment.
54. 651 F.2d at 1064 n.9.
55. Id. at 1063.
56. Id. Judge Williams, in his concurring opinion, criticized the majority's treatment of
Crane because he regarded Crane as controlling law. Footnote 37 did not enter into his
analysis of the § 1001 issue.
Judge Williams began with the premise that Crane mandated equal treatment of recourse and nonrecourse debt for § 1001 purposes. Citing United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,
248 U.S. 1 (1931), Judge Williams noted that the freeing of assets theory treats the release
of recourse debt as "property (other than money)." Accordingly, the release of nonrecourse
debt must also be treated as "property (other than money)" subject to the fair market value
limitation. 651 F.2d at 1063-66 (Williams, J., concurring).
Judge Williams's premise that Crane mandated equal treatment of recourse and nonrecourse liabilities in the Tufts situation is open to question. Crane equated recourse debt
with nonrecourse debt when "reality" dictated that an owner of property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage treat the conditions of the mortgage as if they were personal obligations.
Specifically, the Court referred to situations in which the property carried a mortgage lower
than its fair market value. 331 U.S. at 14. In Tufts, the face value of the mortgage exceeded
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on footnote 37, however, undermines horizontal tax equity because,
in determining the amount realized upon the disposition of property, nonrecourse debtors may value the debt at the property's fair
market value while recourse debtors must account for the total
outstanding balance of their debt as either amount realized or, in
certain cases, as a combination of amount realized and cancellation
of indebtedness.'* Additionally, Tufts results in the inconsistent
valuation of nonrecourse debt by allowing the inclusion of the total
value of the debt in the property's depreciable base (unadjusted
basis) while requiring that the amount realized include the debt
only to the extent of the fair market value of the underlying property. This inconsistent valuation stems from the court's focus
solely on the disposition event. By not viewing the transaction as a
whole-from acquisition through disposition-the Fifth Circuit
was unable to arrive at an equitable and internally consistent result. Moreover, the narrow focus allowed the court to avoid
presenting a theoretical justification for the application of footnote
37 within the overall taxation scheme. The rejection of the tax
benefit and economic benefit theories, coupled with the Fifth Circuit's failure to provide an alternative framework for future decisions, is the most questionable aspect of Tufts.
The Fifth Circuit ignored two theoretically sound methods of
accounting for Tufts-type transactions. Either the method advanced by the IRS or a retroactive purchase price readjustment
(PPR method) would have yielded sound tax results. Under the
IRS method, the outstanding balance of the nonrecourse debt at
disposition is included in the basis and amount realized. The PPR
method differs from the IRS method in that the fair market value
of the property at disposition controls both the basis and amount
realized. Both methods result in the consistent valuation of the
nonrecourse debt in an asset's basis and in the amount realized.
The following example illustrates the different results attained
under the Tufts, IRS, and PPR methods: Assume that real property is purchased for $1.8 million and financed with nonrecourse
debt. After five years the owner reconveys the real property to the
creditor because its value has dwindled to $1.4 million. During the
period of ownership, the owner deducted depreciation using the
straight-line method and did not make any principal payments on
the nonrecourse debt.
its fair market value.
57. See Tress. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980).
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ILLUSTRATION

(Dollars in Thousands)
PPR

IRS

Tufts
Amount realized
Adjusted basis"

$1,400
1,350

$ 1,800
1,350

$ 1,400
1,050

Capital Gain
Ordinary Income
Total Gain

$

$

450

$

$

450

$

$

50
50

350
100
450

The $100,000 difference in capital gain between the IRS and
PPR methods is the amount of the depreciation adjustment."9
Under the PPR method, this amount will be "recaptured" as ordinary income, equalizing the total gain recognized under both methods. The separation of gain into ordinary income and capital gain
components is not new to tax law. 60
The depreciation adjustment necessary under the PPR
method lessens an abuse inherent in nonrecourse debt financing-an inflated purchase price giving rise to increased depreciation deductions. The PPR method also eliminates the possibility
raised by the IRS method of converting excess depreciation deductions into capital gains. 1 Thus, under the PPR method, a taxpayer
has no incentive to overvalue an asset at acquisition. Additionally,
the PPR method comports with the statutory scheme of section
752.
B. Section 752 Argument
1. GENERALLY

The taxpayers in Tufts also argued that section 752 of the In58. Under the Tufts and IRS methods, the adjusted basis would be computed as follows: $1,800 - ($1,800/20 yrs. x 5 yrs.) - $1,350. Under the PPR method, the computation
changes to: $1,400 - ($1,400/20 yrs. x 5 yrs.) = $1,050. Because the PPR method's amount

realized only includes the fair market value of the asset at the date of disposition, consistency requires that the basis be readjusted ab initio which, accordingly, necessitates a depreciation readjustment. The basis reflects depreciation computed on a readjusted acquisi-

tion cost of $1,400.
59. ($1,800/20 x 5 yrs.) - ($1,400/20 x 5 yrs.) - $100.

60. See I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
61. One problem with the PPR method as proposed is that the statute of limitations
may bar an adjustment to depreciation. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1976). An alternative application of the PPR method, however, obviates this problem: the property's adjusted basis is

reduced by its decrease in value. In our example, the gain still would be $450,000: ($1,400 [$1,350 - $4001 - $450). The gain is not, however, separated into components.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:352

ternal Revenue Code"" limited the amount realized from the release from a nonrecourse "liability" to the fair market value of the
property. The Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit approached the section 752 issue by considering whether subsection (d), which governs the sale or exchange of a partnership interest, operates independently of subsection (c), which has been characterized as a
codification of Crane's footnote 37.6 3 The Fifth Circuit, reversing
the Tax Court, stated that section 752(c) limited the amount realized from the taxpayers' disposition of their partnership interest to
the fair market value of the property securing the debt." As a matter of statutory construction, the Fifth Circuit correctly interpreted the interplay between subsections (c) and (d).'5 However, a
decision for the taxpayer under section 752(c) without reference to
section 752(b) creates the same inconsistency in valuation that followed from the Fifth Circuit's holding on the section 1001 issue."
2.

SUBSECTIONS

(C) AND (d)

Subsection (d) prescribes the treatment of liabilities on the
sale or exchange of partnership interests and directs that partnership liabilities be treated like nonpartnership liabilities. Subsection
62. I.R.C. § 752 (1976) provides:
§ 752. Treatment of certain liabilities
(a) Increase in partner's liabilities
Any increase in a partner's share of the liabilities of a partnership, or any
increase in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the assumption by such
partner of partnership liabilities, shall be considered as a contribution of money
by such partner to the partnership.
(b) Decrease in partner's liabilities
Any decrease in a partner's share of the liabilities of a partnership, or any
decrease in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the assumption by the
partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as a distribution of
money to the partner by the partnership.
(c) Liability to which property is subject
For purposes of this section, a liability to which property is subject shall, to
the extent of the fair market value of such property, be considered as a liability
of the owner of the property.
(d) Sale or exchange of an interest
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, liabilities
shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the sale or
exchange of property not associated with partnerships.
63. See W. McKE, W. NELsoN & R. WHITMoRz, FzDEPAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTN RS
7.04 n.43 (1977) [hereinafter cited as McKz]; Perry, Limited Partnerships
and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX L. Rzv. 525, 542 (1972).
64. 651 F.2d at 1063 n.8.
65. See infra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
66. See infra note 82-83 and accompanying text.
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(c) places a fair market value limitation on liabilities and is introduced by the words "[f]or purposes of this section."'
Although the Tax Court recognized that subsection (c)'s introduction explicitly states that the fair market value limitation applies to all of section 752," it stated that "such interpretation
would be inconsistent with the language of section 752(d) and the
rationale for the holding of Crane."69 The Tax Court reviewed section 752's legislative history and found "that the fair market value
limitation of subsection (c) was intended to have narrow applicability. ' 70 The Fifth Circuit, however, did not believe that an indepth examination of the statute's legislative history was
necessary. 71
The House and Senate Committee Reports explaining section
752 open with a discussion of transfers between partners and partnerships to which subsections (a) and (b) apply,"' and note that
"[tlhe transfer of property subject to a liability by a partner to a
partnership, or by the partnership to a partner, shall, to the extent
of the fair market value of such property, be considered a transfer
of the amount of the liability along with the property."" The Tax
Court interpreted this statement as indicating "that in setting
forth the fair market value limitation, Congress had in mind only
[subsection (a) and (b)] situations . . . ." This interpretation
67. I.R.C. § 752(c) (1976).
68. "[T]he language of section 752 is broad enough to support the [taxpayer's] interpretation ... " 70 T.C. at 768.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 767.
71. It is arguable whether subsection (d), on its face, so clearly conflicts with subsection
(c)'s fair market value limitation that it renders the "[fjor purposes of this section" language
ambiguous and therefore subject to further inquiry. One can criticize the Fifth Circuit, however, for an overly formalistic analysis when it halted its examination after the subsection
(c) review and did not examine the potential ambiguity arising from subsection (d): "Obviously, our holding [on § 752(c)] extinguishes any conflict that the Commissioner might see
in the provisions of § 752." 651 F.2d at 1063 n.8. As the textual discussion following this
footnote indicates, whether § 752's legislative history and interpretive regulations express a
congressional intent to have subsection (d) operate independently of subsection (c) is an
open question.
72. "Frequently, a partner will assume partnership liabilities or a partnership will assume a partner's liabilities ....
The provisions of this section prescribe the treatment for
such transferred liabilities." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Seass. A236, reprinted in
1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 4017, 4376 [hereinafter cited as Houss Rpoilr]; S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 405, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 4621,
5047 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. The two committee reports are identical except
for a brief introductory remark by the Senate Committee.
73. Housz Rzpowr, supra note 72, at A236; SENATE REPOrt, supra note 72, at 405.
74. 70 T.C. at 768. The Tax Court made a similar argument using the Treasury Regulations. Section 1.752-1(c) of the regulations provides in part-
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arises from a negative implication; any inferences beyond the committees' actual words are speculative."
The Tax Court also quoted from the committee reports in its
discussion of subsection (d): "When a partnership interest is sold
or exchanged, the general rule for the treatment of the sale or
exchange of property subject to liabilities will be applied."s6 The
Tax Court drew another negative inference from the committees'
failure to mention a fair market value limitation" and assumed
that the general rule for determining "amount realized" required
inclusion of the full amount of a nonrecourse liability, irrespective
of the property's fair market value.78 The court cited Millar and
Woodsam for this rule.7 ' The committee reports, however, were
written before Millar had been decided, and Woodsam did not embrace a factual situation in which a nonrecourse liability exceeded
the property's fair market value.60 Several commentators have
surmised that Congress enacted section 752 to extend the Crane
doctrine to the partnership arena, with subsection (c) codifying
footnote 37.81 This latter interpretation leads to the conclusion
that Congress intended the fair market value limitation to apply
also to partnership transactions.
Section 752's legislative history does not clearly indicate
whether subsection (d) should operate independently of subsection
(c). Therefore, based on statutory construction, section 752(c)'s allinclusive introductory language justifies the Fifth Circuit's conclusion on this issue.
(c) Liability to which property is subject. Where property subject to a liability

is contributed by a partner to a partnership, or distributed by a partnership to a
partner, the amount of the liability, to an extent not exceeding the fair market
value of the property at the time of the contribution or distribution, shall be
considered as a liability assumed by the transferee.
Tress. Reg. § 1.752-1(c) (1956).

75. A counterargument could be made that the committees' failure in the reports to
expressly exclude subsection (d) from subsection (c)'s all-inclusive introductory clause manifested the committees' satisfaction with the plain language of the statute.
76. 70 T.C. at 768 (quoting Hous. RzPORT, supra note 72, at A236-37, and SENAT
REPORT, supra note 72, at 405) (emphasis in original)). The committees' language appears
within an illustrative example in which the fair market value exceeds the amount of the

liability-a Crane-type fact pattern. No reference is made to a footnote 37 situation.
77. 70 T.C. at 768.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 63.
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3.

SUBSECTION

(b)

Section 752(b) eliminates the possibility of inconsistent valuations of nonrecourse debt. Subsection (b) in conjunction with subsection (c) requires a reduction of the taxpayer's basis in the partnership whenever the fair market value of the asset falls below the
amount of the nonrecourse liability, because section 752(c) limits
the value of the liability to the property's fair market value. Section 752(c)'s fair market value limitation necessitates a constructive distribution under subsection (b), resulting in a reduction of a
partner's basis in his partnership interest."' Thus, on disposition,
the nonrecourse debt would reflect the same value-the fair market value of the property as prescribed by subsection (c)-in both
the adjusted basis and the amount realized. This reduction in the
adjusted basis and in the amount realized is consistent with the
PPR method's basis readjustment.8
IV. CONCLUSION
Tufts v. Commissioner allows a taxpayer to enjoy the tax benefit arising from the use of nonrecourse debt without an offsetting
tax detriment following the release from this nonrecourse "obligation." The creation of this potential tax abuse renders the Tufts
result difficult to accept." The Fifth Circuit's holding on the section 1001(b) issue reopens the footnote 37 Pandora's box to all who
dispose of real property subject to nonrecourse debt.95 Additionally, the court erroneously resolved the section 752 issue by failing
to revalue the nonrecourse liability in the partnership basis pursuant to section 752(b). A proper result can only be achieved by valu82. See, e.g., McKEz, supra note 63,

7.04[2] n.45:

Any liability which the owner of property is permitted to include in basis

should also be included in the amount realized on disposition of the property, in
order to accurately reflect gain on the disposition. To the extent this result is
not dictated by § § 752(c) and 752(d), upon the sale of a partnership interest, it

may be achieved in the form of a constructive distribution under § 752(b).
(emphasis added).
83. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
84. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the potential for abuse resulting from its decision.
The court indicated, however, that the responsibility for remedial action lies with Congress.
651 F.2d at 1064 n.9.

85. The Fifth Circuit's holding would not be applicable outside of the real estate context because of § 465's "at risk" limitation. I.R.C. § 465 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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ing a nonrecourse liability consistently in both the adjusted basis
of an asset and in the amount realized upon its disposition.
STEVEN KASS

